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DERIVATIVE SUITS: DIRECTOR DEMAND
UNDER RULE 23.1 AND SECTION 36(b) OF THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
I. Introduction
In 1882, the Supreme Court first established' the conditions
precedent to an ordinary derivative action' by the shareholders of a
corporation.' Now, after over nine decades of common law develop-
ment, the present conditions are embodied in Rule 23.1 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Of relatively recent interest, however,
is the relationship between that Rule and section 36(b)5 of the In-
vestment Act of 1940 (Act),' which authorizes a derivative ac-
tion by the shareholders of a registered investment company.7 This
Note will focus on one aspect of that relationship-the requirement
that a plaintiff make a demand upon the corporation's directors
before he institutes his action.
Rule 23.1's requirement' of a director demand has been the source
1. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
2. A derivative suit is an action brought by stockholders to enforce a corporate claim. In
a sense it is both a representative and a class action. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
534-35 (1970).
3. The derivative or secondary suit may be distinguished from the direct action by a
corporation in its own behalf against a third party, and from the individual shareholder suit
against the corporation, in that although the derivative plaintiff is a stockholder, the poten-
tial benefit runs to the corporation. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 360 (3d ed. 1970).
See also Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1957); W. CARY, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 733-37 (4th ed. abr. 1970).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. This Rule is the cumulation of three previous efforts to regulate
the institution of derivative suits in federal courts. The Supreme Court, immediately
after its decision in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882), adopted Equity R. 94 as an
attempt to state in definite form the holding of that case. 104 U.S. ix (1882). The Supreme
Court modified the rule slightly when it promulgated Equity R. 27, 226 U.S. 657 (1912), which
added the phrase "or the reasons for not making such effort." Equity R. 27 applied only to
"corporations." Former Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b), 308 U.S. 28 (1939) made some changes which
enlarged its scope to all associations, incorporated or unincorporated. Rule 23.1 substantially
restates the principles of Rule 23(b). See Tasner v. Billera, 379 F. Supp. 821, 825 n.4 (N.D.
11. 1974).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
6. Id. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-21 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act].
7. Id. § 5(a)(1). This section defines "investment companies."
8. Rule 23.1 provides that in an action brought by a shareholder to enforce a right of the
corporation: "The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by
the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors . . . and the reasons for his
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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of much controversy. 9 One particularly controversial issue is
whether the demand should be presumed futile, and therefore ex-
cused, when the complaint alleges that: (1) a corporate board was
controlled and dominated by a minority of the directors; and (2) the
majority of the directors approved the corporate wrongdoing of this
minority.'" When the board members so accused are the directors
of a mutual fund," there is the additional question of whether the
traditional case law on excuse of director demand should apply to
derivative actions involving investment companies organized under
the Act.
In 1973, the First Circuit addressed this issue in In re Kauffman
Mutual Fund Actions.'2 There, plaintiff brought suit as a share-
holder in four mutual funds and also as a representative of share-
holders of other funds. 3 He alleged that certain fund directors, who
were also directors of the fund's advisory firms, conspired with the
other funds and their advisers to set schedules of excessive, noncom-
petitive management fees, based solely on the average net assets of
the funds rather than on the managerial services performed by the
advisers. 4 Plaintiff made no demand on the directors because, he
alleged, any demand would have been futile due to the nature of the
allegations. 11
The district court dismissed the derivative action for failure of
plaintiff to satisfy the Rule 23.1 demand requirement." The court
of appeals affirmed. It held that plaintiff's allegations-that the
affiliated directors and the funds had "acquiesced, encouraged, co-
operated, and assisted in the effectuation" of the conspiracy-failed
9. Rule 23.1 does not per se require a demand on the directors. If no such effort is made,
however, the rule requires an explanation. Of the two alternatives-making the demand or
explaining its absence-courts seem to favor the former. See 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 287, 291
(1974). Demand gives the corporation's management an opportunity to examine the merits
of the stockholder's claim of wrongdoing and determine if it can be resolved without litigation.
Id.
10. See sections II. B, C infra.
11. "Mutual Fund" is a common term denoting open-end investment companies. Mutual
funds are companies that offer securities representing a proportionate share of their invest-
ment portfolios and will redeem outstanding shares at current net asset value. For more
detailed descriptions of the structure and nature of investment securities, see 1 L. Loss,
SECURITIEs REGULATION 144-47 (2d ed. 1961).
12. 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
13. Id. at 261.
14. Id. at 262.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 264.
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to establish that the majority, unaffiliated directors participated in
the transactions. Thus, the allegations were not sufficient to satisfy
Rule 23.1.'1
Kauffman subsequently became the leading mutual fund case on
excuse of director demand in situations involving allegations of
domination and control of a board by a wrongdoing minority. Courts
in a number of other circuits have either followed"5 Kauffman or
attempted to distinguish 9 it on the facts. However, in a recent case
involving allegations similar to those in Kauffman, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, in Boyko v. The Re-
serve Fund, Inc.,2" ruled that the Kauffman reasoning no longer
applied to mutual fund derivative actions.
Plaintiff in Boyko was a shareholder in a mutual fund. The defen-
dants were the fund (nominally) and its external investment
adviser. Plaintiff alleged that the management fee schedule, again
based solely on a percentage of the net assets of the fund, was
excessive and unreasonable in light of the growth in fund assets and
volume of managerial services required from the investment ad-
viser.2 He further alleged that no demand was made upon the
fund's directors because they were designees, nominees, and persons
controlled by the defendant adviser. Moreover, since these fund
directors had allegedly "participated and acquiesced in the wrongs
complained of," turning the suit over to the fund would "place
prosecution of this action in the hands of persons friendly to the
defendant [adviser]. '"22
The basic issue in Boyko was essentially the same as in
Kauffman: whether mere allegations of bias and control would serve
to excuse demand. 3 The Boyko court agreed with the First Circuit
that ordinarily they would not be sufficient. However, in contrast
17. Id. at 267 (Coffin, C.J., concurring).
18. See, e.g., Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Royston v.
Eastern Empire Corp., 393 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Tasner v. Billera, 379 F. Supp.
815 (N.D. I1. 1974).
19. See, e.g., Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th
Cir. 1975); Abbe v. Goss, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,319 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Penn Central
Sec. Litigation v. Pennsylvania Co., 367 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
20. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
21. Id. at 98,538.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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to Kauffman, the Boyko court concluded that in a derivative action
brought under section 36(b) of the Act, the demand requirement of
Rule 23.1 was met by an allegation that there was at least one
interested person on the board of directors of the mutual fund.24 In
such cases, the demand would be presumed futile.
II. Prior Law & Rule 23.1
A. The Three Views
Traditional case law on mutual fund derivative actions has been
ambiguous at best.25 Judicial construction of the Rule 23.1 director
demand requirement has, however, followed three general ap-
proaches.
One view essentially presumes fidelity and diligence on the part
of the corporate directors .2 An opposite view presumes that demand
on the directors would be futile under certain conditions.27 A third
view prefers the use of "sound discretion" to presumptions.2 1
Varying interpretations of the Rule 23.1 demand requirement
have arisen in several different classes of cases. One such class in-
cludes cases in which the wrongdoers constitute a majority of the
board at the time the action reaches the court." Another such class
24. Id. at 98,540.
25. See section ii. B, C, D infra.
26. It has been suggested that, in a given case, the construction given the demand require-
ment is a function of the court's public policy views on the desirability of the derivative
remedy. Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 346 (D. Mass. 1951). One respected jurist has
observed that in jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts, where the narrow view is prevalent,
"[tihe emphasis is on precedent and adherence to the older ways, not on creating new causes
of action or encouraging the use of novel judicial remedies that have sprung up in less
conservative communities." Id. For a comparison of the "Massachusetts view" and the "New
York view," see Greenspun v. Lindley, 36 N.Y.2d 473, 479, 330 N.E.2d 79, 82, 369 N.Y.S.2d
123, 127-28 (1975).
27. The demand requirement is less stringent, and demand therefore often excused, where
the "useful gadfly" philosophy prevails, see, e.g., Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 346
(D. Mass. 1951), and the derivative suitor's role as a "corporate policeman" is viewed with
favor, cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). See also Brendle
v. Smith, 46 Supp. 522, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), in which the court notes a number of positive
achievements for derivative actions.
28. The centrist, or sound discretion, approach seems to have gained increased favor with
both the courts and the commentators. See, e.g., Jannes v. Microwave Communications, 57
F.R.D. 18, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1972) ("Recent cases have made clear, if the question was ever in
doubt, that . . . whether an excuse is sufficient is within the sound discretion of the court.");
3B J. MooRE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1 19, at 23.1-254 (2d ed. 1975) ("it
lies within the sound discretion of the court to determine the necessity for demand").
29. See, e.g., Nusbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th
NOTES
involves situations in which some or all of the allegedly wrongdoing
directors have been replaced, so that active wrongdoers no longer
constitute a majority of the board." While there has been something
less than judicial unanimity vis-A-vis these classes of cases, there is
probably the greatest divergence of views when allegations of minor-
ity control, or passive acquiescence by the majority, are the basis
of the plaintiff's failure to make the demand.'
B. Presumptive Director Fidelity and Diligence
The rationale for this view lies in the business judgment rule.32
The basic premise is that "[t]he directors represent all the stock-
holders and are presumed to act honestly and according to their best
judgment for . . . all. 33 Therefore, the directors "have no reason to
protect an outside wrongdoer at the corporation's expense. ' 34 Conse-
quently, the decision whether or not to sue the alleged wrongdoer is
a matter of internal management, and stockholders should not be
allowed to force the corporation to sue, if the directors "have exer-
cised their business judgment in good faith . . . .
These courts assume that the directors are loyal to the corporate
entity and would diligently prosecute any wrong done to it. As a
result they generally tend to be unreceptive to allegations of board
control by a wrongdoing minority: "If by plaintiff's merely alleging
error, the directors are to be presumed incapable of exercising sound
business judgment, Rule 23.1 would become virtually meaningless
''36
An illustration of the presumption of director fidelity and dili-
Cir. 1975); Abrams v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361 (N.D. Ill. 1974); In re Caesars,
Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
30. See, e.g., Brody v. Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111, 1114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1104 (1973); Nelson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 399 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (S.D. Cal.
1975); Independent Investors Protective League v. Saunders, 64 F.R.D. 564, 571 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
31. See section III.A, B infra.
32. Under the business judgment rule rationale, if the directors decide that no suit is
warranted, a shareholder's suit should be precluded if it appears that the board's decision
was a legitimate exercise of business judgment consistent with its fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders. See Note, Shareholders' Derivative Suits in Minnesota:
Function and Operation of the Control Requirements, 54 MINN. L. REv. 978, 988 (1968).
33. Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903).
34. Ash v. IBM, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
35. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
36. Tasner v. Billera, 379 F.Supp. 815, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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gence is found in Lerman v. ITB Management Corp. : Plaintiff was
a shareholder in a mutual fund which switched from internal to
external investment management. Four of the fund's trustees
(directors) were also directors of the proposed investment adviser.
Upon approval of the investment advisory contract, two of these
"double directors" resigned from the fund's board, leaving a minor-
ity of two affiliated directors on the fund's five man board. At the
time of the suit, only one of the fund's trustees was affiliated with
the investment adviser."
Plaintiff alleged fraud and self-dealing. He also asserted that be-
cause of the overlap between the directorates of the fund and the
adviser, annual reapproval of the investment advisory contract was
assured. Moreover, he charged that the wrongdoers controlled the
fund and would prevent diligent prosecution of any action."
The court held that mere allegations of control over the nonaffi-
liated majority were insufficient to meet Rule 23.1's requirement
that the complaint allege with particularity the nature of the de-
mand made. 0 Thus, the complaint was dismissed. The court stated
that since only one current trustee had participated in the approval
of the original advisory contract, "it cannot be reasonably presumed
that a majority of the trustees were involved in the alleged wrongdo-
ing . . . . I' Moreover, the court refused to presume that the major-
ity was committed to the course of action initiated by its predeces-
sors, or that it would be futile to propose an alternative course,
which would be more beneficial to the fund and its shareholders."
C. Presumptive Futility
Courts espousing this view are likely to consider director demand
futile in a broad range of situations. They question whether a
37. 58 F.R.D. 153 (D. Mass. 1973).
38. Id. at 156-57.
39. Id. at 156.
40. Id. at 159.
41. Id. at 157.
42. Id.
43. Examples of the language typically used by the courts in sanctioning non-demand,
include that the directors are "antagonistic toward the plaintiff," or that the demand would
be "unavailing," "useless," "an idle ceremony," or "farcical." For listings of cases employing
such language in excusing demand, see 3B J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORES FEDERAL PRACTICE
11 23.1.19 (2d ed. 1975). See also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL § 1831, at 378-80 (1972).
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"theoretically disinterested majority of the board can be 'expected
to weigh impartially a charge against their accused colleagues
'' 44
If the wrongdoers picked the outside directors, a court may be
skeptical that any "meaningful action" would be forthcoming, even
where each member of the affiliated majority has expressly deposed
that he is not dominated by the accused wrongdoing minority, he
would investigate the shareholders' complaint, and he would take
appropriate action.45 In such a situation, one court stated that while
the outside directors might not be wholly dominated, the majority
would not "be likely to undertake the difficult and demanding task
of prosecuting a lawsuit for fraud against those who elected them."46
Consequently, the court concluded that demand on the directors
would have been a "futile and useless gesture." 47
An illustration of this view in a mutual fund situation is Papilsky
v. Berndt. 8 Plaintiffs were shareholders in a fund whose adviser was
also its underwriter. They alleged that certain practices, i.e., recip-
rocal brokerage, give-ups, and interpositioning, redounded to the
benefit of the adviser instead of the fund, and that the fund could
have recaptured some of its commissions had its directors not "par-
ticipated in or acquiesced in" the challenged transactions. 9 The
defendants argued for dismissal on the grounds that plaintiff's alle-
gations of dominion and control of the unaffiliated directors by the
minority affiliated directors were not sufficient to excuse director
demand under Rule 23.1.50
The court held that more than mere control was alleged due to
the "strategic positions of the affiliated directors on the board of the
Fund."'" It further observed that all of the fund's directors partici-
pated in or acquiesced in the challenged transactions, and thus the
44. See Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative
Suit, 73 HnAv. L. REV. 746, 754 (1960), quoting Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 344
(D. Mass. 1951).
45. See de Hass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd in part,
435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
46. Id. at 814.
47. Id. at 815.
48. 59 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
49. Id. at 96.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 97.
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case was distinguishable from Lerman.52 Finally it noted the Second
Circuit rule that where the directors were "involved in the transac-
tion attacked, a demand on them is presumptively futile and need
not be made."53
D. The Sound Discretion Approach
Overtones of this view, which emphasizes the use of sound judicial
discretion rather than presumptions, were heard in an early Su-
preme Court case where it was said that Equity Rule 94 (an early
predecessor of Rule 23.1) should be "given such play as to fit the
conditions of different cases."54
An illustration of this approach in a mutual fund situation is
Phillips v. Bradford, 55 where three separate mutual funds all had the
same directors and a common adviser. The adviser gained informa-
tion concerning the impending collapse of a stock (Penn Central)
owned by all three funds. Plaintiff sued the directors, the adviser,
and all three funds, alleging that the advisers and directors caused
one fund (Mutual) to delay sale of its Penn Central shares until the
other two funds had sold 100 percent of their Penn Central shares.
As a result, the average price received by Mutual for its Penn Cen-
tral shares was only one-half that received by the other two funds."
Plaintiff also asserted that she was excused from making demand
since it would have been a futile gesture.57
The court first rejected the presumption of futility, stating that
''merely naming the directors does not establish that a demand
would have been futile."5 It then rejected the rationale that courts
should not interfere with business decisions by businessmen.5" In-
stead, the court based its decision on the facts of the instant case,
52. Id.
53. Id., quoting Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir.
1955).
54. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany Sus. R.R., 213 U.S. 435, 452 (1909).
55. 62 F.R.D. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
56. Id. at 684.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 688; accord, Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Jones
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,986, at 97,404 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
59. See, e.g., Ash v. IBM, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1964). "Most courts
respect the directors' business judgment and will not interfere with decisions concerning
business matters, regardless of whether the directors' judgment proves correct." Note,
supra note 32, at 988.
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which indicated that a conflict of interest was apparent and that
demand would have been futile.'"
III. Section 36(b) and The New Derivative Action
A. The Boyho and Kauffman Decisions
While the demand provisions of Rule 23.1 have been subject to
many and varied judicial interpretations, what must be alleged in
a section 36(b) complaint is an issue which had not been addressed
by the courts prior to Boyko.0 '
Faced with a question of first impression, the Boyko court might
have decided the case by simply adopting one of the three views and
thereby extending the traditional common law rules on director
demand to section 36(b) actions. Instead, it analyzed the complaint
in terms of the most demanding of the traditional standards, i.e.,
the Kauffman view, and used this analysis to bring out the inappro-
priateness of the common law rules for the new derivative action."
Boyko and Kauffman both involved mutual fund shareholders
suing derivatively on behalf of the funds and alleging excessive
management fee schedules. 3 The Boyko court noted that two of the
reasons pleaded for not making a demand upon the directors in
Kauffman were also similar to those alleged in Boyko: (1) the fund's
directors were "controlled" by the adviser, and (2) the fund's direc-
tors "participated and acquiesced" in the wrongdoing. 4
With regard to the first reason, the Kauffman view was that mere
allegations of domination and control were insufficient to satisfy
Rule 23.1. The court reasoned that if there had been a majority of
self-interested defendant directors, then a conclusion of control
might properly follow. But since the directors affiliated with the
adviser constituted less than a majority of the fund's board, conclu-
sory pleading was not enough. The First Circuit's standard for
sufficiency of allegations of control was that "[pilaintiff must al-
60. Phillips v. Bradford, 62 F.R.D. 681, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
61. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
62. Id. at 98,540.
63. See text accompanying notes 16, 23 supra.
64. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304, at 98,538.
65. This view reflects the so called "ratification theory," which requires a demand on
directors unless the wrongdoers constitute a majority of the board of the allegedly injured
corporation. See Note, supra note 44, at 747.
66. 479 F.2d at 264.
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lege specific facts demonstrating the unmistakable link between the
inaffiliated majority and the affiliated and allegedly wrongdoing
minority." 7
With regard to the second excuse, the Kauffman court also held
that mere allegations of approval of suspect contracts were insuffi-
cient to excuse demand:"8
Where mere approval of the corporate action, absent self-interest or other
indication of bias, is the sole basis for establishing the directors' "wrongdo-
ing" ... plaintiff's suit should ordinarily be dismissed.
Further, the court refused to create an exception in the case of
unaffiliated directors of a mutual fund simply because a stockholder
alleged a corporate injury stemming from the adviser-fund relation-
ship." The rationale advanced for this refusal was that while self-
dealing by any corporate director is usually suspect, "Congress rec-
ognized . . . that a certain type of self-dealing is endemic in a
mutual fund, and must be permitted."7 Moreover, the court rea-
soned that Congress had adequately compensated for the endemic
self-dealing by requiring that all mutual fund boards must contain
a minimum number of "watchdog"'" directors not affiliated with the
advisers. The First Circuit concluded that these watchdog mutual
fund directors were subject to the same fiduciary obligation as a
disinterested director "in any other corporate venture."" The court
therefore declined to adopt a presumption of futility, and (in the
67. Id.
68. Id. at 265.
69. Id. at 266.
70. Id.
71. See Comment, Duties of the Independent Director In Open-End Mutual Funds, 70
MICH. L. REv. 696, 701 (1972) where it was noted that "the men who need to be watched pick
the watchdogs to watch them." Further, the adviser is not likely to choose an independent
director who will be hard on it, or for that matter to even take the job seriously. It has also
been suggested that independent directors are reluctant to vigorously exercise the little power
they have, because it would be unpleasant to countermand people that they like, respect, and
have worked with for years, and that this is probably the only reason they were put on the
board in the first place. Id. at 701-02.
72. 479 F.2d at 266-67. At the time of the commencement of the Kauffman action, the
Act required that at least 40 percent of a fund's directors not be "affiliated" with the fund's
adviser. The Act was amended in 1970 to require that not more than 60 percent of the
directors be "interested persons," a broader category. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970).
73. 479 F.2d at 266.
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words of the Boyko court) "adhered to the traditional pleading re-
quirements."74
After noting the similarity between the two complaints, the
Boyko court observed that "under the traditional pleading require-
ments of Rule 23.1 as set forth in the Kauffman opinion, the perti-
nent allegations of the instant complaint would be insufficient to
excuse prior demand . . . ... . However, the court found it worthy
of note that the Kauffman rules were "applicable to derivative ac-
tions in general and not peculiar to actions brought on behalf of
mutual funds against their investment advisors for excessive com-
pensation.'"I
The court observed that the two actions differed in at least one
significant respect. The Kauffman action was commenced prior to
the effective date of the recent amendments to the Investment Com-
pany Act. The Boyko plaintiff, however, brought his action pur-
suant to section 36(b) of the Act, which became effective in June,
1972.11
B. The New Fiduciary Duty
When it enacted section 36(b), Congress created an explicit fidu-
ciary duty on the part of the investment adviser." In so doing,
"Congress recognized the unusual relationship between the invest-
ment company and its advisor,"" and the unique structure"' of the
74. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304, at 98,539.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35-(b) (1970) provides that:
[Tihe investment advisor of a registered investment company shall be deemed to
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of
payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by the
security holders thereof, to such investment advisor or any affiliated person of such
investment advisor.
79. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304, at 98,539.
80. The uniqueness of the investment company industry structure may be traced to the
organizational history of most trust funds. Generally, an investment adviser, either in the
form of a corporation or a partnership, nominates its board of directors. The board then
approves an advisory contract with the investment adviser. Thus, while still under the control
of its creators the fund enters into a management and research contract with these creators.
See Note, Mutual Funds and Their Advisors: Strengthening Disclosure and Shareholder
Control 83 YAi.E L.J. 1475. See also Simpson, l(b), or not l(b). . . . ? Recognition of
Legislative Intent in Judicial Interpretation of Investment Company Act of 1940, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 890 (1972).
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mutual fund industry where "the forces of arm's length bargaining
do not work in the . . . same manner as they do in the other sectors
of the American economy.""
Moreover, the creation of the fiduciary duty evidenced another
Congressional recognition with regard to cases like Kauffman and
Boyko: 2
[Tlhat the directors of the investment company would be antagonistic to-
ward, and unlikely to prosecute, an action against the fund's advisors for
breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation.
The court further observed that the fund in Boyko admitted its
opposition to the lawsuit and argued that a decision of its board not
to prosecute would preclude a shareholder from asserting the claims
derivatively. 3 It added that "while this rule might be appropriate
in other kinds of derivative actions, its application in this context
would clearly thwart the purpose of Congress in enacting Section
36(b) . . .,,"
The court's rationale for this conclusion was that a majority of the
board of an investment company is rarely composed of "interested
persons."" Thus, mutual fund derivative suitors would not normally
be able to meet the Kauffman requirements."
The Boyko court noted that the Kauffman case has been cited
by the Second Circuit87 with approval.88 In the face of this apparent
81. 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4897, 4901.
82. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304, at 98,540.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See section III.A. supra.
87. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304, at 98,539. The Boyko court was here referring to the
Second Circuit's comments on Kauffman in Brody v. Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111, 1114
(2d Cir. 1973). However, Brody was more concerned with the "new director" aspect than the
"minority control" aspect of the director demand issue. The new director aspect was also
present in Kauffman and was the reason why Chief Judge Coffin concurred with the majority.
479 F.2d at 267.
88. In Papilisky v. Berndt, 503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam) the Second Circuit
had an opportunity-subsequent to both the district court decision in Papilsky and the First
Circuit decision in Kauffman-to state its positionon the issue in question, but chose not to
do so. There the Second Circuit panel noted that the district judge, in a "reasoned" opinion,
had excused demand based on allegations that the unaffiliated directors, and that all the
directors had participated or acquiesced in the challenged transactions. However, the opinion
did not reach the merits, and the appeal was dismissed on other grounds. Id. at 555. Therefore
it may be questioned whether the Second Circuit's citation to Kauffman was "with ap-
proval."
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authority from two Courts of Appeals, the court found it inappro-
priate to decide the first section 36(b) director demand case on the
basis of traditional "common law rules."89 Instead, it based its hold-
ing on the premise that, in enacting section 36(b), Congress created
"a new type of derivative action."9
C. The New Derivative Action
The court in Boyko observed that "strict application of the
common law rules designed to enforce the particularity requirement
of Rule 23.1 would doubtless mandate the dismissal of most, if not
all, derivative actions commenced under Rule 36(b)." 9' General alle-
gations of bias and control would ordinarily not suffice to excuse
demand, if the Kauffman approach were followed.92 This, the court
opined, would not be in keeping with the legislative recognition of
the unique mutual fund industry structure as reflected by section
36(b).93
[Rather,] the derivative action designed expressly to enforce the specific
fiduciary duty created by Rule 36(b) should not be rendered meaningless by
an application of the more general provisions of Rule 23.1 and the case law
generally applicable to derivative actions.
While the common law standards developed over the years were
sound, the court found that Congress had created a new type of
derivative action to keep in check certain unique problems94 and
abuses95 which have developed in a relatively new industry." The
typical management fee arrangement9" between the fund and its
adviser, which was the gravamen of the complaint in both Boyko
and Kauffman, is probably the most significant problem.9"
89. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304 at 98, 540.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See generally Modesitt, The Mutual Fund-A Corporate Anomaly, 14 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1252 (1967).
95. See generally Note, The Mutual Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis
of Business Incest, 71 YALE L.J. 137 (1961).
96. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304, at 98,540.
97. See Rottenberg, Developing Limits on Compensation of Mutual Fund Advisors, 7
HARV. J. LEGIS. 309, 312-14 (1970). The adviser in fact sometimes wears four hats. Id. at 312
n.17. In Boyko, the annual fee paid to the adviser was a flat .5 percent of the fund's total
assets. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304, at 98,538.
98. The management fees are usually calculated as a flat percentage of the fund's total
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Prior to section 36(b), over fifty suits were instituted challenging
the propriety of compensation arrangements between funds and
their advisers.99 However, the common law strictures were such that
there was never a successfully litigated suit'"" prior to the 1970
amendments to the Act. 10'
Galfand v. Chestnutt,'0 another section 36(b) case, recognized
the burden on plaintiffs alleging excessive management fees. It pos-
ited that one of the purposes of section 36(b) was to overrule existing
case law which subjected plaintiffs to an untenable burden (of prov-
ing mismanagement and Waste) if the "advisory contracts were...
approved by a vote of disinterested directors . . . ."10 It noted that
in the mutual fund industry, where the fund and its adviser were
closely related, such a common law rule was "unduly restrictive."'0 4
assets under the advisers' managment. While it may be simplistic to say "it costs no more in
research effort to buy 100 shares than 1000 shares," the cost of managing a fund does increase
proportionately with its assets, and significant economies of scale do exist in mutual fund
management. Thus, as assets grow, advisers' profit margins grow at a much faster rate, and
in large funds the profits can become immense. See Sterrett, Reward For Mutual Fund
Sponsor Entrepreneurial Risk, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 195, 203-04 (1973).
99. See Sterrett, supra note 98, at 204. The impropriety of the enormous fees may be
particularly gross in the case of "money market" funds such as the fund in Boyko. Money
market funds experienced tremendous growth during the "tight money" high interest rate
periods of the early 1970's. They primarily invest in "cash equivalents" and short-term
securities, such as treasury bills, certificates of deposit, and commercial paper, rather than
stocks and corporate bonds. Their return on investment is essentially tied to the prime
rate, the Federal Reserve Bank's monetary policy, and the economy as a whole, rather than
to the earnings prospects of dividend paying ability of particular corporations. As a result,
the number of investment decisions and volume of advice, required from the adviser to keep
assets invested in money market instruments, is relatively low. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,304, at 98,538.
100. See Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees And The New Standard of Fiduciary
Duty-Interpreting The 1970 Mutual Fund Act, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 627 (1971). Most of the
suits ended in settlement. Id. at 636. Only three major advisory feee cases were fully litigated.
See Kurach v. Weisman, 49 F.R.D. 304, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also 60 Geo. L.J. 1594,
1601 (1972).
101. See Manages, The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970-An Analysis and
Appraisal After Two Years, 14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 387, 392-93 (1973).
102. 402 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The initial decision in Galfand was prior to
Boyko. However, the "Supplemental Findings and Conclusions" were subsequent to Boyko.
103. Id. at 1325.
104. Id. The Galfand court further noted that in post-amendment management fee cases,
one of the factors the court may wish to consider in determining whether the advisor has
fulfilled his fiduciary duty is whether the deliberations of the directors were a matter of
substance or a "mere formality." Id. at 1326.
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However, while the Galfand and Boyko courts both held that
demand would have been futile in their respective section 36(b)
actions, they did so on very different bases. The Galfand court
adopted traditional'"5 common law rules, albeit the broader rules of
Papilsky, rather than those of Kauffman.
On the other hand, the Boyko court moved away from the tradi-
tional common law rules, and created significant new law. The
Boyko court noted that the common law rules on demand require-
ments "are not to be blindly applied to newly created derivative
actions."'0 6 It therefore held that if it is alleged that at least one
interested person sits on the board of the mutual fund, "the require-
ment of Rule 23.1 is met in a section 36(b) action,"' ' and the "futil-
ity of making a demand" on the entire board will be presumed."'"
IV. Conclusion
The strict standard of pleading adopted by the First Circuit in
Kauffman may well have placed an overly burdensome obstacle in
the derivative plaintiff's path.''0 The new standard adopted by the
district court in Boyko clearly lessened this burden for mutual fund
derivative suitors.
Boyko is of course still subject to appellate scrutiny. And, in
recent cases such as Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," the Supreme
Court has shown a tendency to tighten pleading requirements in
non-derivative class actions. If, however, the principle of Boyko
withstands appellate review, it may well help open the doors of the
judicial forum to other types of quasi-public plaintiffs. Conceivably,
various other types of private attorneys general-i. e., in other types
of class actions, consumer actions, environmental actions, etc.-
may ultimately stand to benefit from the Boyko departure from the
traditional common law pleading strictures.
Archie E. Williams, Jr.
105. Id. at 1331.
106. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,304, at 98,540.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 287, 303 (1974).
110. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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